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The labor costs regulations such as the minimum wage, the contributions to social 
security and the payroll taxes has been the subject of intense debates and academic 
discussion because the distortions and inefficiencies they may cause on the labor 
markets. Colombia has one of the onerous labor regulations in the region both because 
of their relatively high minimum wage and the elevated contributions to social security 
and payroll taxes. Chile, in contrast, has a flatter structure of non wage labor costs with 
few labor costs different from the wage in charge of the employers. So as to determine 
the impact of labor costs on informality, size of the workplace and labor earnings we 
estimate a simultaneous model using three stage least squares for Colombia and Chile. 
After calculating the reduce form of the model we perform several simulations. We find 
that the changes in the labor regulations of the last two decades have deeply affected the 
functioning and outcomes of the labor markets. In the Chilean case such regulation has 
contributed to hinder informality among the non skilled workers, to incentive the 
placement of workers in relatively large firms being at the same time neutral in 
distributional terms. The Colombian labor regulation of the last 20 years has promoted 
informality among the non skilled, prompted formality among the skilled, confined the 
non skilled in small firms and deeply contributed to the rise of concentration of labor 
earnings. 
Key words: Labor costs regulations, labor informality, minimum wage and size of 
workplace. 
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Las regulaciones sobre el salario mínimo, las contribuciones a la seguridad social y los 
impuestos a la nómina han sido objeto de debate por sus implicaciones sobre el mercado 
laboral. Colombia se convirtió en años recientes en uno de los países con los costos 
laborales de ley más altos de la región. Chile, en contraste ha tenido periodos de 
flexibilización laboral que incluyen, entre otros, diferenciación de salario mínimo para 
jóvenes y reducciones de las cargas efectivas para las empresas. La regulación afecta en 
forma profunda el funcionamiento del mercado laboral impactando tanto los ingresos 
laborales como la informalidad laboral lo que tiene implicaciones significativas en la 
distribución del ingreso. Este trabajo intenta mostrar el impacto de la regulación sobre 
los resultados laborales para Colombia y Chile. Se estima un modelo de ecuaciones 
simultáneas para cada uno de los países para determinar el impacto de los costos 
laborales con cargo al empleador sobre la informalidad, y a través de esta sobre el 
tamaño del sitio de trabajo  medido en número de trabajadores y los ingresos laborales. 
Con base en los resultados se muestra que parte de las diferencias en la distribución del 
ingreso entre Colombia y Chile están explicados, en parte, por las estructura de los 
costos laborales. Adicionalmente se presentan simulaciones sobre la distribución de los 
ingresos con base en cambios en los parámetros de costos laborales 
Palabras claves: Regulación de los costos laborales, informalidad laboral, salario 
mínimo y tamaño de empresa.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The informality of employment is one of the greatest problems that face the developing 
world. Informality is associated with low labor earnings, lack of protection to social 
security, low levels of technology and innovation bringing about inequality, poverty and 
social exclusion. A recent study of the OECD (2009) has pointed that “Informal is 
Normal” as an important proportion of the jobs in the developing world do not comply 
either with the labor regulation of the countries or the international standards such as 
those established by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The sources or causes 
of informality of employment are diverse and there exist an immense literature on the 
issue. One of the most studied factors linked to informality are labor regulations as they 
may turn from a mechanism to protect workers into a barrier that impede the creation of 
formal jobs.  
 
The informality trends of Chile and Colombia have been quite different in the last 
twenty years. Chile has exhibited relatively lower rates of informality –around 35% 
measured by lack of contribution to pension system and a more narrow informality gap 
between skilled and non skilled workers than Colombia. In fact, in the latter country the 
informality rate has fluctuated around 50% -measured by the lack of social protection in 
health or pension or 60% taking only pension- yet the informality gap between skilled 
and non skilled workers has sharply widened as for the skilled workers it has dropped 
while for the non skilled it has augmented. Other differences in labor outcomes between 
Colombia and Chile are the size of the workplace and the earning gap formal/informal. 
In Chile a greater proportion of the labor force works in large firms while in Colombia 
the trend is the opposite. In Chile the earnings gap formal/informal has remained more 
or less constant while in Colombia it has broadened. 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine the role of the labor costs –as the sum of wages 
and non wage cost in charge of the employer – on the informality rates, size of the 
workplace and the distribution of labor earnings in the last 25 years in Colombia and the 
last 20-years in Chile. In Chile the minimum cost of formal hiring comprised by the 




as a result of the increase of the latter while non wage costs in charge of the employer 
have remained low. In contrast, Colombia has experienced increases both in the 
minimum wage and in no wage costs. We argue then that the bad and perverse 
performance of the Colombian labor outcomes vis a vis the Chile’s ones are rooted in 
the differences of labor regulations of the two countries. Since the two countries offer 
such different experiences an analysis of them countries using the same methodologies 
and tools may help to discern the role of the regulations on the inefficiencies and 
distortions of the labor market. 
 
This work is divided in eight sections being the first one this introduction. The second 
section describes the legislation and the evolution of labor costs for Colombia and 
Chile. The third section reviews some of the literature on the impact of labor costs and 
minimum wage on labor market outcomes, the fourth presents the data sources and the 
descriptive statistics for the two countries. The fifth section develops a simple 
theoretical model of labor costs and informality. The sixth explains the empirical model 
and presents its results while the seventh detailed the simulations undertaken. Finally 
section eight contains the conclusions.  




The wage and non wage labor costs for Colombia can be divided in five components as 
follows:  1) the base wage whose legal floor is the minimum wage: 2) the contributions 
to social security in health and pension; 3) the insurance against workplace risks; 4) the 
payroll taxes (called parafiscales) to finance i) childcare for the poor through the 
Institute of Family  Welfare, ii) technical training of the labor force through the 
National Service for Learning, iii) the family subsidy paid to the Cajas de 
Compensacion; 5) other wage and non wage costs such as severance payments, 







The minimum wage and the transportation subsidy are set every December through a 
government decree issued after labor unions and producers’ organizations agree on the 
following year rise that depends upon past and expected inflation and productivity 
growth. As Graph 1 shows real minimum wage has risen 40% in real terms from 1984 
to 2009 but it has had three cycles: from 1984 to 1986 when its index rose from 100 to 
117 to fall to 107 in 1997 and to steadily grow to 140 in 2009.  
As of social security, its most important change occurred with the Law 100 of 1993 that 
modified the health and pension systems. The Law 100 created two health systems: the 
subsidized and the contributive regimes3. The formal workers would belong to the latter 
that would pay a percentage of their wages to finance their health insurance (4%) and to 
save for their pensions (2%) in individual accounts. The employer would pay as well a 
percentage for health (8%) and for pensions (6%). The contributions to the social 
security system have experienced several modifications. In 1996 the contribution to 
pension increased to 10% (25% paid by the employee and 75% by the employer) and in 
2003 the Law 797 ruled that it would rise gradually until 14% in 2006. 
The payroll tax destined to finance public childcare centers (ICBF) was fixed in 2% by 
the Law 27 of 1974 and was raised to 3% in 1988. The payroll taxes to finance the 
national training system (SENA) and the family subsidy (Cajas de Compensación) were 
set in 2% and 4% by the Law 58 of 1963 and have remained unmodified since then.  
The Law 50 of 1990 reduced firing costs by modifying the so called “severance 
payments retroactivity “. The previous regulation established that the severance 
payment would be calculated using a base wage the very last one the worker was 
earning no matter how much higher was such last wage compared to the wages earned 
by the worker during her labor life in the firm. The Law 50 determined that severance 
payment at time t would be calculated using the wage at t, severance payments at t-1 
using the wages at t-1, etc. According to Lora and Henao (1995) the older regulation 
increased labor costs in average by 13.5%. The Law set in 8.3% the severance payment 
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to be monthly deposited in individual accounts4. Other labor costs are comprised by 
midyear and Christmas bonuses (8.3%), vacation bonus (4.17%) and transportation 
subsidy (12% of the minimum wage) paid to the workers earning until two minimum 
wages and workplace risks (2.63%). 
As a whole, social security contributions, payroll taxes and the other non wage labor 
costs paid by the employer made 52.2% of the wage in 1980, 50.6% in 1991 and 63.7% 
in 2009.  After adding up the minimum wage and non labor costs we obtained the 
minimum costs of formal hiring. The index of costs has evolved from 152 to 178 from 
1980 to 1986 and then fell to 160 in 1991. After that year the index progressively 
augmented and reached 228 in 2009 as shown in Graph 1. 





In Chile the legal labor and non labor costs comprise four items: 1) the wage that has as 
a floor the minimum wage; ii) the contributions to social security for health and 
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pension; iii) the insurance against workplace risks; 4) unemployment protection and 
severance payments5. 
The minimum wage is established through a discussion among unions, government and 
employers taking into account past inflation and labor productivity. Graph 2 displays 
the evolution of the real minimum wage index (1986=100) showing that after the 1987’s 
drop it has continuously increased to 259 in 2009. Chile introduced in 1989 a 
differential minimum wage for workers below 18 and above 65 years old fluctuating 
between 74% and 86% of the minimum wage. 
One of the main institutional changes that affected Chilean labor costs was the 
privatization of the social security system ordered by the decree 3500 of 1980. Such 
decree reduced employer’s contribution from 30% to 0%. At the same time, the decree 
determined that employees would pay 10% of their wages for pensions, 4% for health 
and 3% for disability insurance. In 1982 the Law 18.196 increased health contribution 
to 5% and then the Law 18.492 of 1985 to 7% paid entirely by the employee and has 
remained in that percentage since then. In 1987 the Law 18.646 raised the pension’s 
contributions between 1% and 2% to finance the AFP’s administrative commission. 
Thus, pension contribution reached 12% totally in charge of the worker.  
In 1995, the Law 19.904 raised the disability insurance around 2%-4% for workers in 
“heavy labor”, half paid by the employer and half by the employee. In 2001 the 
government created the unemployment insurance and fixed it in 3% of which 2.4 were 
paid by the employer and 0.6% by the worker (see Graph 2). 
Graph 2. Index of Minimum Cost of Formal Hiring for Chile 
                                                          





Chilean labor legislation during the dictatorship also changed in regard to firing costs. 
Thus, the decree 2.200 of 1978 established that in case of firing the employer would pay 
to the worker one monthly wage per each year of work in the firm until a maximum of 
150 days. Such payment would not apply when the firing was on justified causes 
including among them economic problems of the firm. En 1990 the Law19.010 
modified the decree and extended the severance payment until 330 days excluding the 
economic reason as a just cause of firing. Moreover, if the firm could not prove 
bankruptcy the worker should relieve an additional 20%. This latter percentage was 
increased to 30% by the Law 19.759 of 2001.  As a whole, the non labor costs in charge 
of the employer increased from 8.3% to 12.2% during 1990-2009 although the largest 
modifications to labor regulations occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. 
3. Literature on the impact of labor costs 
 
The economic literature on the effects of labor regulations on labor market outcomes –
demand for labor, unemployment, informality, wages- is quite large. Several works 
have found that such regulations have little or no impact (Card and Krueger 1995; 
Lemos, 2008; Farné 2010 among others) particularly in developed countries. However, 
Heckman and Pages (2004) compiled several studies for Latin America and found that 
the impacts of such regulations are negative or perverse in most cases mainly because 
such regulations bring about binding restrictions and distortions on the labor market. 
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and those related to job security and nonwage labor costs showing how those 
regulations may lead to segmentation of the labor markets. 
Rigorous pieces of work have also been produce for the Colombia on this regard. Bernal 
and Cardenas (2004) estimated the long run labor demand elasticity to labor costs and 
deduced that 10% in labor costs would increase the labor demand between 1.5% and 
5%. Vargas (2006) estimated that the social security contributions to health and pension 
would lower the numbers of hours worked particularly among women. Kugler and 
Kugler (2009) analyzed the impact of payroll taxes on the labor demand in the 
manufacturing sector and found that a 10% increase in such taxes would reduce 
between 4% and 5% labor demand. Mondragon-Velez et al. (2010) found that the rise of 
labor costs –both non wage and wage- increase the probability of transition to 
informality and the size of informality sector no matter its definition. Mejia and Posada 
(2007) examined the relationship between informality and degree of enforcement of the 
labor laws and found that an increase in labor taxes leads to a lower efficiency of 
production which could be seen as the social cost of informality.  Arango et al (2009) 
found that there exists high sustituibility between skilled and non skilled labor and 
much less between labor as a whole and capital. They revealed that a permanent 
increase of 1% o minimum wage lowers in 0.33% the demand of non-skilled labor and 
raises in 0.3% that of skilled labor.  
As of Chile, Gruber (1995) examined the impact  in the manufacturing sector of the 
reduction of payroll taxes from 30% to 5% during the 1980s and found no effect on this 
reduction on employment as such reduction was fully passed on to workers in the form 
of higher wages. Edwards & Edwards (2000) found that a reduction of formal 
employment costs increases slightly real wages and lowers unemployment duration. 
That occurs because both sector cut down their differences in labor costs. Montenegro 
and Pages (2004) reviewed the vast Chilean experience of changes of labor regulations 
founding that job security provisions and minimum wage negatively affects 
employment for youth and non-skilled benefiting the older and skilled workers.  
Amodeu-Dorantes (2004) analyzed the relationship between informality and poverty in 
Chile revealing that household poverty increases in 3% and 6% the likelihood of having 





The impact of labor costs have been extensively studied by using the impact of the 
minimum wage. For instance Card and Krueguer (1995) found that minimum wage not 
always have perverse consequences on employment. Acemoglu (2001) shows that 
minimum wage combined with unemployment subsidy may in some case improve 
income distribution. In contrast, Neumark and Wascher (2008) stated that minimum 
wages reduced both employment opportunities for less skilled workers and earnings 
among the lowest skilled individuals. In addition, redistribute income among the low 
income families and may increased poverty. Besides it has longer run effects on labor 
earnings by hindering the acquisition of human capital. Nevertheless, the studies on the 
impact of minimum wages and labor costs for the developed world although may offer 
useful insights not are always pertinent for the developing world.  In the USA’s case –
for instance- the minimum wage is relevant for a small proportion of the labor force. 
Bell (1997) compared the effects of minimum wage in Colombia and Mexico during the 
1980s founding that in former country minimum wage determines more strongly global 
wages hence its increase had a pronounced impact on disemployment for non skilled 
workers (between 2% and 12%). In contrast, in Mexico where minimum wage does not 
affect most wages its impact in employment outcomes was negligible.  Maloney and 
Nunez (2004) showed for some Latin American countries that negative impact of 
minimum wage on employment is stronger the smaller its distance to the median wage. 
The impacts of minimum wage and minimum costs of formal hiring on the distribution 
on earning also depend upon the localization of those costs with respect to the median 
or mean earnings. If a rise in labor costs increases earnings of non-skilled and poor 
more than it diminishes their employment inequality may improve. Comparing the cases 
of Brazil and Colombia Angel-Urdinola y Woodon (2003) showed that this is an 
empirical matter. 




The objective of the present document is to determine the impact of the minimum costs 




income. The worker’s formal/informal status utilized here is based on the ILO’s 
definition of informal employment that is concerned with the characteristics of the jobs, 
rather than the economic unit to which they belong. Thus, the criteria for defining 
informal unemployment are mainly that the jobs have no written contract and lack of 
social protection6. Thus, a worker not insured to health and not contributing to pensions 
through their job was classified as an informal worker. The health insurance and the 
pension contribution may be either deducted in full from the worker’s payment as in 
Chile o paid by both the employer and the employee as in Colombia.  For ILO the 
workers with public health insurance are informal. 
For the Colombian case the data come from the Households surveys that had an 
informality section every two years in the second quarter from 1984 to 2000, then every 
year in the second quarter from 2001 to 2006 and with the implementation of the 
“Integrated Great Household Survey” every year during the whole year. The surveys 
contain cross sectional information among other on labor participation, social security, 
working unit size, education, hours worked, labor and non labor earnings and time 
working in the firm. The surveys covered the main 13 cities and their metropolitan 
areas.  
For the Chilean case the data come from the Survey of Socio Economic 
Characterization (CASEN) carried out by the Ministry of Planning.  The CASEN 
surveys have been implemented every two years from 1990 to 2000 and every three 
from 2003 to 2009. The Surveys have worker’s information on affiliation to the health 
(sistema provisional) and pension through the job in addition to employment, labor 
earnings, education and the usual socioeconomic variables of the household. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 contain the descriptive statistics of the evolution of informality for 
Colombia and Chile by firm size, level of education, age, gender, occupational position, 
earning gap and distribution of employment by firm size.  The Colombia informality – 
as contribution to pensions through the job - has dropped from 60.77% from 1984 to 
63.78% in 2009 increasing to 70.58% during the end of the century economic crisis to 
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start slowly falling until 2009.  In the Colombia case, however, the most dramatic 
changes of informality have occurred by educational level (skills). Thus, the informality 
rate of workers with primary education o less remained around 73% until 1996 and then 
jumped to linger around 82.4%. The informality of workers with incomplete and 
complete high school have augmented the most from 74.0% to 86% and from 59.9% to 
86.8% during 1984 to 2009 respectively. In contrast, the rate for workers with 
incomplete college or technical degree have rose from 36.0% to 44.7% from 1984 to 
2002 and then dropped to 42.1% in 2009. As of workers with college degree Table 1 
shows their employment informality was more or less constant around 38% and then 
fell continuously to 27% in 2009. The Colombian trends indicate that although 
informality has slightly reduced the informality gap by skill have actually widen as the 
least educated workers have become more and more informal.   
The trends by age are quite similar having all a rise during the 2000 crisis and fall since 
then. The least informal workers are at ages 25 to 34 and the most the youngest and the 
oldest.  The data also reveal that there are not differences in informality by gender.  In 
regard to informality by firm size Table 1 shows that it has reduce itself for all four 
sizes being the most informal the person size (own account workers) that went down 
from 95.3% to 94.02% and the least informal the plus than 10 workers size that dropped 
from 22.9% to 15.24% during 1984-2009.  As of employment by firm size Table 1 
indicate that in 1984 26% of the workers belong to one person firms (own account 
workers) rising to 37% in 2000 falling a bit to 33% in 2009. In contrast, firms with more 
than 10 workers employed 41% of the labor force in 1984 and 37% in 2009. 
Table 1 also pinpoints that the proportion of non skilled workers working in large firms 
has actually diminished. In fact, in 1984, 28% of the workers with primary education,  
42% of those with incomplete high school and 60% of those with complete high school 
were employed in large firms (more than 11) By 2009 such percentage have 
dramatically decrease to 13%, 20.3% and 42% respectively.  Unlike the trends 
described for non skilled the percentage of workers with college degree in large firms 
has remained constant in the last 25 years around 68%.  
As of labor earnings Table 1 show that the wage gap between formal and informal 













Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Colombia 
 
 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of informality –measured as contribution to 
pensions through the job- for Chile. According to Table 2 Chile’s informality rate Chile 
was 35% in 1990 rose to 42% in 2002 and fell to 36% in 2009. By schooling the 
informality rate has increase for all groups. Accordingly, the rate for workers with basic 
education or less increased from 45% to 59% during 1990-2000 and the fell to 49% in 




2009 from 35% to 41% and from 26% to 29% respectively and the one of workers with 
incomplete and complete college went up from 17% to 22% and from 12 to 15%, 
respectively.   
The informality rate by age dropped from 45% to 37% for the youngest groups -ages 15 
to 24 and rose from 32 to 36% for the oldest –ages 35 to 54. By gender, women have 
had a slightly higher rate than men. As of informality by firm size Table 2 shows –like in 
the Colombian case- that it is higher in 1 person firms (own account workers) increasing 
from 62% to 72% from 1990 and 2009. Informality of workers in firms than 10 
employees has also augmented from 12% to 16%. The percentage of workers working 
in 1 or 2-5 person firms has been more or less constant around 24% for the former and 
around 21% for the latter. On the other hand, workers in firms of 10 or more employees 
comprised 44% of the labor force in 1990 and 50% in 2009. 
Table 2 shows that the percentage of workers with basic education and incomplete high 
school working in large firms –unlike Colombia- has augmented a bit from 33% to 37% 
and from 44% to 46% during 1990-2009, respectively. Similar trends are observed for 
workers with complete high schools and incomplete college or technical education 
having both elevated in 5 percentage points the participation of those workers in large 
firms.  Finally, the percentage of workers with college education in large firms has 
fluctuated around 76% during the period under study.  Unlike Colombia Chile has 
experienced no changes in the labor earning gap between formal and informal workers 
since 1990. 






From the descriptive statistics it can be observed that in Colombia non skill workers 
have become increasingly informal and have moved to the small firms  and workplaces 
as the earnings gap has augmented while in Chile there has been a slight rise in 
informality for all workers accompanied with a shift of non skill workers from small to 
large firms. The next section will develop a simple theoretical able to explain the role of 
rise of labor costs in the labor markets outcomes of both countries observed in the 
descriptive statistics.  
5.  A simple model of informal employment, labor costs and labor earnings 
5.1 Production 
 
An economy produces a homogenous good Y with two types of technologies. Let us call 
F the technology used in the “formal sector” that combines skilled and non skilled labor 
-Ls, Lns and relatively high levels of capital KF and modern technology to produce YF. 
This sector complies with the regulation established in the labor legislation as it pays the 




ones.  The base wage that a particular worker may earn in this sector is at least the legal 
minimum wage.  The other type of technology called I combines non-skilled labor Lns 
with relatively low levels of capital KI and “backward” technology to produce YI. In this 
sector, the workers are “informal” as they have no social protection through their jobs 
and the firms evade the payroll and other taxes. The wages paid in this sector are fixed 
by demand and supply and may be lower than the legal minimum wage. Thus, the 
production of each sector and the total one may be represented as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑓 =  𝑌𝑓(𝐿𝑠𝐿𝑛𝑠𝐾𝐹)   (1)    𝑌𝑖 =  𝑌𝑖(𝐿𝑛𝑠𝐾𝐼)   (2)       𝑌 = 𝑌𝐹 +  𝑌𝐼     (3) 
5.2 Labor Market 
 
The supply of skill labor LsO is a function of the skill labor wages Ws while the demand 
for skilled labor LsD results from the cost minimization of the formal firms subject to the 
.formal technology. The supply of non skilled labor LnsO depends positively of the 
wages of non skilled workers Wns while the demand for non skilled workers LnsD comes 
from the cost minimization of the formal and informal firms. It should be clarified that 
in this simple model “wages in the formal sector mean the total labor costs comprised 
by wage and non wages costs as presented above. Thus, the labor market equilibrium 
may be represented as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑠𝐷𝐹�𝑊𝑛𝑠,𝑊𝑠,𝐾𝐹� =  𝐿𝑠𝑂 (𝑊𝑠)    (4) 
𝐿𝑛𝑠
𝐷,𝐹  � 𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑊𝑠,𝐾𝐹� +  𝐿𝑛𝑠
𝐷,𝐼 �𝑊𝑛𝑠, 𝐾𝐼� =  𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑂 (𝑊𝑛𝑠)   (5) 
 
 
5.3 Comparative Statics 
 
The equilibrium of the labor markets of the skilled and non skilled workers and the cost 
minimization of the formal and informal firms are depicted in the diagram 1 that shows 
graphically the comparative statics of a change in the minimum labor cost of formal 
hiring (either by a rise in the minimum wage or in the non wage costs). Panel 1 
illustrates the cost minimization labor demand of skilled and non skilled workers in the 




workers LnsD,F =(1-ρ0)* LnsD  of the firms in the formal sector, ρ0 stands for the fraction 
of the non skilled workers employed in the formal sector. We assume that non skilled 
workers are paid the minimum wage plus the minimum non wage costs associated with 
the minimum wage and hence the slope of the line cost is equal to - Wmin/Ws.  We also 
assumed for simplicity that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the 
formal sector is zero. Panel 2 contains the labor market of skilled workers in which Ls 
and Ws represent the initial equilibrium. Panel 3 shows the labor market of the non 
skilled workers in the informal sector. The equilibrium corresponds to the quantity 
ρ0*LnsD and to wage Wns.  
Finally, point N in Panel 4 depicts the cost minimizing combination of non skilled labor 
and KI in the informal sector. The slope of the cost line would be equal to Wns/r where r 










Let us assume that the legislation established higher minimum costs of formal hiring 
elevating Wmin to Wmin’. The new cost minimizing demand of skilled and non skilled 
labor is point M’ bearing an increase of the demand for skilled labor from LsD,F to LsD,F’ 
and their wages from Ws to Ws’. In contrast, the demand of non skilled labor in the 
formal sector shrank to (1-ρ0’)* LnsD. Such demand reduction would lead to a greater 
supply of non skilled workers in the informal sector lowering their wages to Wns’. The 
new cost minimizing combination of non skilled labor and capital in the informal sector 
would be N’ in which “backward” capital has been replaced by non skilled labor 
probably reducing even more the size of the informal firms. 
The comparative statics of a rise of the minimum costs of labor hiring entails the 
following results:  




































Thus Ws’/ Wns’ > Ws/ Wns  and Wmin’/ Wns’ > Wmin/ Wns. 
• Reduction of size (less capital) of the informal sector firms 
Such results may imply a deterioration of the distribution of labor earnings and greater 
exclusion of the informal workers from the modern technology and innovation. 
 
5.4 An example 
 
The following equations describe the labor markets of the skilled and non skilled 
workers. 
Demand for skilled workers:  𝐿𝑠
𝐷,𝐹 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝑊𝑠         
Demand for formal non skilled workers:𝐿𝑛𝑠
𝐷,𝐹 = (1 − 𝜌0)* 𝐿𝑛𝑠𝐷  =𝜃 ∗𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛     Demand for 
informal non skilled workers:𝐿𝑛𝑠
𝐷,𝐼 = 𝜌0 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑠𝐷 = 𝜁 ∗ 𝑊𝑛𝑠                                     
Supply of skilled workers:   𝐿𝑠𝑂 = 𝛾 ∗𝑊𝑠                  
Supply of informal non skilled workers: LnsO = η*Wns 
Where β, α, γ, η >0 and θ, ζ<0 
Equilibrium in the labor market of skilled workers imply that, on the one hand Ws= 
β*Wmin/( γ+ α) and, on the other,  that δWs/δWmin = β/( γ+ α)>0 which means that a rise 
in the minimum cost of formal hiring bears an increase of the skilled labor wages. By 
the same token, the rise in the minimum cost of formal hiring lowers the demand of non 
skilled workers in the formal sector as δLnsD,F /δWmin= θ <0. 
It is assumed that the laid off formal non skilled workers would increase the supply of 
informal non skilled workers. In consequence in equilibrium LnsO= LnsD,F+ LnsD,I  or  
η*Wns = ζ*Wns + θ*Wmin. It implies that the equilibrium non skilled wage would be    
Wns= θ *Wmin/( η- ζ). Therefore δWns/δWmin = θ/(η- ζ).<0 showing that a rise in the 





6. Simultaneous equation model of informal employment, firm size and labor 
earnings 
 
6.1 A conceptual explanation 
 
For a particular worker the informality of the employment, the size of the workplace 
and the labor earnings are determined simultaneously. In this respect, it is needed an 
empirical model that allows grasping such simultaneity. Hence, the model should be 
able to capture the relationship between the variables related to labor regulation and 
labor outcomes: 
The ratio between the expected labor earnings of a particular worker if she were formal 
and the minimum costs of formal hiring determines the probability of becoming 
informal. It is expected that the link between that ratio and informality is not linear. The 
expected labor earning in a formal employment is just what the average earnings of a 
formal worker with a given human capital and experience in a particular city and year. 
The minimum costs of formal hiring are the sum of the legal minimum wage and the 
contributions to social security, payroll taxes and the rest of non labor costs associated 
to the minimum wage. Thus, the higher the ratio the lower the probability of having an 
informal employment. For instance, if for a particular worker the ratio is lower than 1 it 
means that the minimum costs of formal hiring are greater than the expected 
productivity of that worker as a formal employee and hence the worker’s probability of 
becoming informal would be larger in comparison to another worker  with greater 
expected productivity. 
If the worker exhibits high probability of being informal she would join small firms (or 
one person firms for own account workers) where it is more difficult being detected 
violating labor laws. These firms yet are relatively low capital intensive, lack 
productivity and innovation and, in consequence, their workers are relatively less 
productive. 
Insofar a worker joins a small firm with low productivity and innovation her labor 
earnings would be lower than the earnings she would receive in a large and more 




When the minimum costs of formal hiring are raised the ratio explained in a) would 
diminish increasing the probability of becoming informal for all workers. Nevertheless 
that probability would augment more for those workers with lower ratio.  
Thus, the empirical model should allow the simultaneous estimation of the probability 
of being informal, of belonging to a large firm and the worker´s labor earnings. . 
 
6.2 The empirical model  
 
The expected labor income of a formal worker i is defined as the predicted labor 
earnings using the coefficients obtained from a Mincer’s equation estimated only for 
formal workers. The estimated equation is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑤𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐12−15 + 𝛽5𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐16 + 𝛽𝑘 +
𝛽𝑡                    ( 1) 
 
The equation specification contains the usual coefficients of age and education, 
premiums for incomplete -𝛽4𝑡 and complete college -β5t that change over time, fixed 
effects for city βk and year dummies βt. The expected formal labor earnings are 
calculated using the βs estimators for all workers both formal and informal 
The minimum costs of formal hiring a time t are equal to the legal minimum wage plus 
the social security contributions, the payroll taxes and the rest of non-labor costs 
established in the legislation currently in force. Thus, the minimum costs of formal 
hiring are defined as: 
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡 = 𝑊 −𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶 − 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡)       (2) 
 
MCFHt stands for minimum costs of formal hiring, W-MINt for the minimum wage and 
PERC-NLCt for the percentage of non labor costs. Thus, the ratio that negatively affects 
the probability of becoming an informal worker is �𝑊𝑡
𝑒−𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡




formal labor earnings divided by the minimum costs of formal hiring currently in force.  
As the probability of becoming informal is greater the worker would join firms of 
relatively smaller size and lower productivity and only capable of paying wages below 
the minimum costs of formal hiring. In this regard, informality status, firm size and 
labor earnings are determined simultaneously and, in consequence, so as to comprehend 
their multiple relationships it is required a system of equations that take into account 
such simultaneity. The simultaneous systems are the following: 
• Equation of Informality  










, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠�    (3) 
 
• Equation of firm size 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝒊 = ℎ(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑊𝑖,𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑗,𝑘+10, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠  )  (4) 
 
• Equation for Labor Earnings  
𝐿𝑊𝑖=𝑚(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠       (5) 
 
Where Informalityi is a dicotomous variable equals to 1 if the worker i  is informal and 0 
otherwise, Firm sizei  stands for the firm size of the workplace and is equal to 1 if the 
firm has 10 or more workers and zero otherwise, Lwi is the natural log of the labor 
earnings of worker i. The right hand side variables include the exogenous variables plus 
control variables such as educational level, age range, households characteristics and 
city or region fixed effect and year dummies. Since the estimation to be undertaken is of 
a system of equations the identification of the structural parameters depends upon the 
compliance of the order and rank conditions. The order condition requires that the 
number of exogenous variables omitted from the equation m must be equal or greater 
than the number of endogenous variables that appear on the right hand side of the 




instruments of the endogenous variable Ym in the equation where Ym is used as 
independent variable. 
The three equation model fulfills the order conditions since the number of exogenous 
variables excluded in each equation is at least equal to the number of endogenous 
variables appearing in the right hand side of the equation (Wooldridge, 2006). Thus, in 
the informality equation that has firm size on the right hand side are excluded years o 
schooling, age, age2 and the percentage firms with more than 10 workers in the sector 


















 and the percentage firms with more than 10 workers in 
the sector and city. 
 
6.3 Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation for Colombia of the simultaneous model of 
equations (3) to (5). The coefficients of the exogenous variables or instruments are 
statistically different from zero and have the expected signs. The results for the 




�the lower the probability of becoming informal. Thus is such ratio increase in 
one unit the linear probability of being informal reduces itself in 0.067. The positive 
sign of quadratic term reveals that the negative effect is lower as the ratio turns larger. 
The coefficients also show that the impact of ratio �𝑊𝑡
𝑒−𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡
� is different for level of 
education (column 1). Workers with incomplete and complete high school face a 
stronger effect of the variable �𝑊𝑡
𝑒−𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡
�on their probability of becoming informal than 
those workers with complete college. For the latter the linear and quadratic impacts are 
close to zero (-0.067+ 0.061) and (+0.0108-0.0099). The coefficient of the percentage of 
workers in firms with more than 10 workers indicates that the probability of getting a 




The estimators of the earnings equation show that the variables schooling years, age and 
age square determine –as expected- variations in labor income. 
As of the endogenous variables effects the coefficients reveal that firm size and 
informality status are simultaneously determined. Thus, higher probability of working in 
a large firm is associated with less probability of having an informal employment and 
the other way around (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3). At the same time, large firms are 
associated with higher labor earnings. The results show that workers of large firms earn 
in average 17% more than those in small ones (column 3).  
The coefficients of the exogenous variables for the Chilean case are similar to 
Colombia’s (Table 4). Thus, the ratio  �𝑊𝑡
𝑒−𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡
� has a negative impact on the 
probability of becoming an informal worker (column 1). Thus, if such ratio grows one 
the probability of having an informal job diminishes in 0.07 but its impact vanishes for 
large ratios as the quadratic coefficients suggests. The interaction of  �𝑊𝑡
𝑒−𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝐻𝑡
�,  with 




�on informality would be lower (-0.07+0.033) than for workers with 
complete high school or less (column 1). 
The coefficients of the endogenous variables point as in Colombia that in large firms the 
probability of being an informal workers is lower (column 1 Table 4) and that the being 
informal is negatively associated with large firms. Finally, the larger the firm size the 





































































Observations 474098 474098 474098
R-squared 0.361 0.175 0.386
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
lnw








Table 4. Results for Chile 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Strong Informality size(+10 or more) lnw












e)/MCF*incomplete high school 0.000838
(0.00617)
(Wi























Proportion of firms(+10 or more workers) 0.247***
(0.00564)






Controls by year yes yes yes
Controls by education yes yes yes
Controles by ages yes yes yes
Controls by  cities yes yes yes
Constant 0.800*** 1.614*** 10.22***
(0.0165) (0.0319) (0.0334)
Observations 536211 536211 536211
R-squared 0.193 0.058 0.279
Standard errors in parentheses





7. Reduced Form Coefficients and Simulations 
 
From an econometric point of view the impact of the minimum costs of formal hiring on 
the labor market outcomes may be determined using the structural form whose results 
were already explained by calculating the reduced form coefficients. The latter 
presented in Table 5 allow expressing the system of equations exclusively in terms of 
the exogenous variables and the controls (Woolbridge, 2006). After calculating the 
reduced form coefficients it will be feasible to calculate the long effect of the exogenous 
variables – particularly the minimum cost of formal hiring- on the three endogenous 
variables (see appendix 2 for the explanations of the reduced form coefficient 
calculation). 
Table 5. Reduced Form Coefficients for Colombia 
 
 
Thus, the reduced form estimation throw coefficients πi that are a non linear 
combination of the structural parameters already estimated. The interest of this work is 
to determine the effects of the changes of minimum costs of formal hiring on the 
trajectory of three endogenous variables: informal employment, firm size and labor 
earnings and their distribution. So as to determine the effects of the regulation regarding 
the minimum costs of formal hiring in the trajectory of the endogenous variables some 
simulations were undertaken.  Thus, it is calculated the informal employment, the size 
VARIABLES Informality Firm Size Ln w
Wi
e/MCF -0.782 0.857 0.321
(Wi
e/MCF)2 0.126 -0.138 -0.052
(Wi
e)/MCF*high school -0.154 0.168 0.063
(Wi
e)/MCF*incomplete high school -0.017 0.018 0.007
(Wi
e)/MCF*incomplete collegue 0.277 -0.303 -0.114
(Wi
e)/MCF*collegue 0.710 -0.778 -0.292
((Wi
e)/MCF*high school)2 0.052 -0.057 -0.022
((Wi
e)/MCF*incomplete high school)2 0.034 -0.037 -0.014
((Wi
e)/MCF*incomplete collegue)2 -0.044 0.048 0.018
((Wi
e)/MCF*collegue)2 -0.116 0.127 0.047
Proportion of firm(+10 or more workers) -0.729 0.874 0.328
Years of schooling 0.0282 -0.0338 0.056
Age 0.0284 -0.0340 0.057
Age_square -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005




of the workplace and distribution of labor income would have been had the minimum 
costs of hiring stayed the same as the ones observed in 1992. 
The results of the simulations are presented Graph 3 and Graph 4. Graph 3 shows the 
distributions of the observed and simulated linear probabilities of informality. It is clear 
that the entire distribution moves to the left. A t test for the difference in the mean of the 
simulated and the observed suggests that the informality would have been 7 points 
lower had the minimum costs of hiring remained unchanged since 1992.  Nevertheless, 
the difference for workers of primary education reaches 13 points (Graph 4), while for 
the workers with college degree only 3 points.  Hence, it is apparent that the increase of 
the minimum costs of formal hiring has negatively affected the most the non-skilled 
workers. 
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Graph 4. Predicted and Simulated Probability of Informality for Colombia (Maintaining labor cost of 1992) 
 
 
As of the size of the firm the simulations of Graph 5 indicate that percentage of 
employees working in firms of more than 10 workers would have been 6 points higher 
had the minimum costs of formal hiring kept unmodified since 1992.  
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In the case of Chile the impacts are much smaller than in Colombia. For instance, had 
the rise of the minimum costs of formal hiring remained unchanged since 1992 
informality would have been only 0.02 lower and the amount of worker in large firms 
0.01 percentage points higher (see Graph 6 and Graph 7). 
Graph 6. Predicted and Simulated Probability of Informality for Chile 
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Finally, we simulate the impacts on distribution of labor earnings. As the theoretical 
model predicts the increase in minimum costs of formal hiring augments the 
concentration of labor earnings for the Colombia case. Table 6  had minimum costs of 
formal hiring remained constant the Gini coefficient would have been one point lower 
during 1992-2000 and three points lower during 2002-2009. This is a sizeable impact. 
Performing the same simulation exercises for Chile we observe no difference between 
the simulated and observed Gini coefficients (see Table 7).  
Table 6. Simulations of informality and firma size for Colombia. 
 
 
Table 7.  Simulation of the impact on distribution of labor earnings for Colombia 
 
Total 64.2 61.7 423.3 38.26 41.0 -420.0
Primary 81.9 77.3 424.8 20.6 24.7 -422.0
Incomplete High School 71.7 68.5 363.7 32.2 35.7 -360.0
High School 53.3 51.5 196.8 48.9 51.0 -200.0
Incomplete Collegue 42.0 40.8 73.6 60.1 61.4 -73.4
Collegue 35.3 33.2 -110.0 66.6 65.9 105.9
Total 65.8 58.3 590.3 33.7 41.99 -590.0
Primary 87.2 73.7 917.6 12.6 27.4 -920.0
Incomplete High School 80.7 70.8 531.5 19.9 30.8 -530.0
High School 61.0 56.0 268.8 39.1 44.6 -270.0
Incomplete Collegue 44.1 38.1 260.7 54.6 63.2 -260.0



















1994 0.564 0.0068 0.560 0.00155
1996 0.549 0.0092 0.548 0.00123
1998 0.545 0.0036 0.540 0.00117
2000 0.515 0.0040 0.508 0.00115
2002 0.523 0.0025 0.513 0.00126
2004 0.519 0.0027 0.508 0.00108
2006 0.499 0.0026 0.486 0.00097
2008 0.508 0.0079 0.492 0.00107
2009 0.462 0.0044 0.445 0.00080
Promedio (1992-2002) 0.535 0.531




Table 8. Simulations of informality and firma size for Chile. 
 
 





Total 40.7 37.2 495.6 44.89 48.5 -500.0
Primary or less 53.5 49.4 412.6 33.8 38.1 -410.0
Incomplete High School 40.8 37.4 220.4 44.3 47.7 -220.0
High School 29.5 27.0 188.7 53.1 55.8 -190.0
Incomplete College or 
Tecnical education
20.1 17.1 152.1 64.2 67.2 -150.0
Complete College 14.3 12.5 46.4 74.6 76.4 -46.6
Total 40.5 39.2 665.2 47.1 57.8 -660.0
Primary or less 53.7 37.6 230.0 34.2 51.8 -230.0
Incomplete High School 43.0 36.1 180.8 44.8 51.9 -180.0
High School 30.5 26.8 109.9 55.9 59.7 -110.0
Incomplete College or 
Tecnical education
22.9 12.6 418.3 66.1 76.6 -410.0
Complete College 15.8 9.0 91.1 76.8 83.9 -91.4
2003-2009
1992-2000













1990 0.553 0.00443 0.55198 0.00189
1992 0.561 0.00372 0.56103 0.00154
1994 0.556 0.01064 0.55671 0.00135
1996 0.553 0.00336 0.55534 0.00127
1998 0.559 0.00417 0.56360 0.00128
2000 0.555 0.00293 0.56104 0.00107
2003 0.554 0.00396 0.56212 0.00090
2006 0.527 0.00298 0.53435 0.00092
2009 0.515 0.00251 0.52351 0.00097
Promedio (1992-2002) 0.557 0.560




8. Conclusions  
 
This paper attempted to analyze the consequences of the changes in labor regulation on 
labor markets outcomes and income distribution for Chile and Colombia. These two 
countries have undertaken different reforms regarding labor costs and hence the labor 
market outcomes have been dissimilar. Chile’s structure of the non wage labor costs 
was modified during 1980s basically eliminating the labor costs different from wages in 
charge of the employee. As a result the trends of minimum labor costs of formal hiring 
have followed the minimum wage. The latter have soared in the last 20 years yet 
keeping itself around 40% of the per capita GDP. In the Colombian case, the labor costs 
in charge of the employee have sharply risen since the early 1990 as a result of larger 
social security contribution for health and pension in addition to the other non wage cost 
such as payroll taxes, bonuses and transportation subsidies.  In this regard, the 
Colombian minimum wage have augmented nearly 40% in real terms from 1980 to 
2009 yet falling from 70% to 60% of GDP per capita but the total labor costs –wage and 
non wage –have risen from 100% to 130% of per capita GDP since de mid 1990s to 
2009. Thus, the index of labor costs has risen almost 43% since 1992. 
 
We state in this paper that the a large parte of differences in the tendencies in labor 
outcomes in both countries such as informality, size of the workplace, wage gap and 
distribution of labor earnings have obeyed to the dynamic of labor costs. In fact, it is 
observed that in Chile informality rate –measured as affiliation to the pension system- 
has remained more or less constant around 36% since 1990.  In addition, the informality 
gaps between skilled and non skilled workers have also remained invariable. Besides 
the percentage of the labor force working in large firms increase from 45% to 50% 
reducing the percentage in firms with 2 to 10 workers. Unlike Chile in Colombia it is 
observed a rise of the informality gap as the workers with college education exhibit as 
of 2009 less informality rates and the less skill ones more informality than in 1984 or 
1992. Besides, the proportion of non skilled working in large firms has shrunk together 
with a drop of the share of the total labor force working in large firms. In fact, large 





So as to explain such divergent trends we developed a simple theoretical model and 
estimated an empirical one. The theoretical model pinpoints that a upsurge in the 
minimum costs of forma hiring unambiguously raises informality of the non skilled 
workers, depresses their wages and reduce the size of the informal firms. Simultaneous 
equations models were estimated using micro data for Chie and Colombia so as to 
capture the impact of the minimum costs of formal hiring on the probability of being 
informal and through that channel on the size of the workplace and labor earnings. After 
calculating the reduced forms we carried out a series of simulations founding that a 
large proportion of the labor markets outcomes –informality, firm size and labor earning 
distribution- are explained in the Colombian case by trends in labor costs. Thus, the 
simulations reveal that had the minimum costs of formal hiring kept at the 1992 level 
informality would have been 9 percentage points lower, the percentage of the labor 
force in large firms 6 percentage points higher and the Gini coefficient of labor earning 
0.3 points lower.  The impacts of the labor costs for Chile are much smaller as they have 
























Appendix A 1. Descriptive statistics of Chile. 
 
 









1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009
Elementary or less 33,1 35,8 33,9 30,8 34,0 32,1 32,7 37,0 36,6
Incomplete High School 44,2 45,5 45,4 40,9 44,0 43,5 43,3 47,7 45,6
High School 52,8 53,4 53,8 48,6 55,1 53,0 53,8 58,7 57,6
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 63,4 66,2 66,0 59,0 64,3 63,3 64,7 68,0 68,0
Complete College 75,4 73,5 76,2 70,6 76,0 74,6 76,0 78,4 77,2
Elementary or less 48,0 50,2 51,6 45,7 45,0 49,0 44,6 41,4 37,5
Incomplete High School 17,6 17,2 15,6 17,7 17,1 15,5 15,4 15,0 14,1
High School 19,8 20,5 20,5 22,9 23,8 23,4 25,9 29,1 33,1
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 8,09 6,5 7,4 8,1 8,1 7,3 8,1 8,7 9,3
Complete College 6,49 5,7 4,94 5,64 5,93 4,86 6,0 5,83 6,1
Percentage of 
employed by 
education levels on 
companies of 11 or 
more workers
Percentage of 
emplyed by education 
levels
1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009
Elementary or less 27,89 25,75 24,55 24,44 25,95 23,56 18,55 14,27 12,26 12,6 13,41 11,47
Incomplete High School 41,93 39,71 37,06 37,8 39,52 35,8 27,77 24,71 19,83 19,85 21,19 18,39
High School 59,96 56,4 54,25 54,38 54,72 53,39 46,69 42,32 39,37 39,43 39,61 38,06
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 69,46 66,8 63,45 64,76 63,37 63,49 59,4 55,43 52,38 53,89 53,8 56,21
Complete College 68,19 66,38 66,74 67,49 67,91 69,63 66,09 63,67 66,1 66,82 66,83 68,14
Elementary or less 45,41 43,36 40,9 36,21 33,51 32,36 32,19 31,09 29,36 27,68 25,46 24,6
Incomplete High School 28,41 28,0 28,1 28,13 28,17 26,58 23,7 23,88 22,81 21,18 19,73 18,29
High School 14,35 15,89 17,05 20,01 21,4 24,09 24,44 25,25 27,3 28,63 30,26 29,4
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 5,53 5,68 6,12 6,93 7,32 6,79 8,23 8,54 8,4 9,35 10,41 13,42
Complete College 6,3 7,07 7,83 8,72 9,59 10,18 11,44 11,24 12,13 13,15 14,14 14,29
Percentage of 
employed by 
education levels on 









Appendix A 3.  Informality by age group of Colombia. 
 
 
Appendix A 4. Informality by age group of Colombia. 
 
 









Age group 1984-1992 1994-2002 2004-2009
15-24 67,54 74,37 72,39
25-34 53,62 59,73 57,64
35-54 60,69 62,70 62,25




















Age group 1990-1994 1996-2002 2003-2009
15-24 46,64 48,42 45,75
25-34 34,63 36,82 35,23
35-54 37,80 40,73 38,22






















Elementary or less 922.735 895.012 914.313 823.895 1.038.258 896.369 835.618 599.920 614.566 624.426 726.688 654.088 607.337
Incomplete High School 1.121.766 1.022.566 945.787 917.858 1.115.118 965.263 993.782 704.938 674.743 687.755 731.037 656.643 633.525
High School 1.419.500 1.260.065 1.189.458 1.162.577 1.417.387 1.190.567 1.145.666 823.750 789.725 783.851 826.336 705.536 734.204
complete College or Tecnical educati 1.791.581 1.626.584 1.529.239 1.515.559 1.732.008 1.711.848 1.683.264 1.119.113 1.118.597 1.042.028 1.054.276 927.787 899.360
Complete College 3.727.736 3.171.381 3.159.214 2.985.127 3.901.786 3.900.649 3.373.765 2.110.557 2.009.606 1.839.617 1.930.515 2.012.586 1.881.213
Elementary or less 678.024 652.525 645.740 596.672 723.841 676.614 547.449 353.627 316.783 311.153 360.486 369.538 378.961
Incomplete High School 801.475 781.613 704.207 654.889 831.717 721.143 599.392 442.276 339.671 344.404 384.236 420.408 442.915
High School 1.275.694 1.116.870 1.040.982 949.806 1.304.758 955.393 841.803 546.722 453.467 436.065 462.733 487.373 498.862
complete College or Tecnical educati 1.528.053 1.433.871 1.329.042 1.110.396 1.684.217 1.303.484 1.107.859 741.303 591.755 535.979 590.099 583.912 595.128
Complete College 2.811.482 2.600.935 2.350.021 2.246.245 3.377.304 2.464.791 2.617.024 1.346.239 1.212.213 1.016.138 1.080.528 1.311.665 1.395.340
Elementary or less 0,70 0,74 0,73 0,74 0,71 0,69 0,73 0,78 0,76 0,76 0,75 0,72 0,75
Incomplete High School 0,54 0,59 0,58 0,60 0,57 0,56 0,62 0,66 0,69 0,69 0,68 0,63 0,67
High School 0,32 0,36 0,36 0,36 0,36 0,34 0,41 0,45 0,47 0,46 0,45 0,42 0,44
complete College or Tecnical educati 0,26 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,26 0,25 0,30 0,33 0,35 0,32 0,29 0,23 0,24
Complete College 0,23 0,25 0,23 0,19 0,21 0,17 0,21 0,22 0,18 0,16 0,14 0,13 0,13
Elementary or less 4,68 4,24 4,14 4,33 4,66 4,92 5,15 4,76 4,82 4,44 4,00 4,29 4,17
Incomplete High School 3,71 3,44 3,69 3,74 3,98 4,43 4,31 3,65 4,22 3,78 3,65 3,79 3,60
High School 2,56 2,51 2,62 2,62 2,75 3,30 3,15 2,78 2,95 2,74 2,72 3,13 2,88
complete College or Tecnical educati 2,04 1,93 2,02 2,03 2,21 2,28 2,13 1,96 2,00 1,94 1,97 2,27 2,20
Complete College 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2006
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Appendix A 8. Wage statistics of Chile 
Elementary or less 184.568 187.502 191.744 203.965 210.810 210.448 211.381 247.352 277.143
Incomplete High School 208.001 214.361 210.453 260.772 264.970 260.962 252.848 299.007 316.408
High School 304.055 302.540 311.860 317.754 310.993 303.341 297.560 322.190 354.054
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 432.457 459.258 453.248 515.162 562.775 525.230 557.879 563.304 566.334
Complete College 789.316 998.560 984.251 1.002.647 1.210.449 1.081.577 1.184.496 1.123.299 1.012.972
Elementary or less 175.669 193.548 171.409 200.430 210.956 193.514 208.067 246.974 276.533
Incomplete High School 211.915 235.817 206.125 272.708 267.476 254.401 246.169 282.616 309.761
High School 345.885 379.051 332.755 367.207 385.045 313.615 318.419 320.486 340.411
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 492.124 655.935 592.214 624.441 724.079 580.097 555.259 556.766 554.179
Complete College 1.107.494 1.725.337 2.276.422 1.472.607 1.601.510 1.225.437 1.374.381 1.154.625 1.041.641
Elementary or less 0,45 0,52 0,53 0,54 0,55 0,59 0,56 0,50 0,49
Incomplete High School 0,36 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,43 0,47 0,45 0,40 0,41
High School 0,27 0,29 0,29 0,28 0,31 0,34 0,33 0,28 0,29
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 0,18 0,19 0,20 0,19 0,22 0,24 0,24 0,21 0,23
Complete College 0,12 0,14 0,12 0,15 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,15 0,16
Elementary or less 4,58 5,78 6,28 5,31 6,03 5,52 5,80 4,56 3,68
Incomplete High School 3,95 4,95 5,45 4,04 4,78 4,29 4,86 3,86 3,24
High School 2,63 3,40 3,57 3,24 3,81 3,60 3,99 3,51 2,91
Incomplete College or Tecnical education 1,87 2,22 2,36 2,00 2,13 2,05 2,18 2,01 1,81
Complete College 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Years
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Appendix A 9.  Regression result of Colombia 
reg3 (inf_pension dsize_4 yhat_formal_cmc1_pension yhat_formal_cmc1_2_pension int2_p int3_p 
int4_p int5_p int2_2_p int2_3_p int2_4_p int2_5_p t_desempleo_ciudad $Xtodo)  
(dsize_4 inf_pension lnw pc_lb_size10 t_desempleo_ciudad $Xd) 
(lnw inf_pension dsize_4 educ edad edad_sq t_desempleo_ciudad $Xtodo) if lnw>0 & exp>=0 & 
ftr001==1; 
 
Three-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inf_pension    4.7e+05     47    .3886642    0.3570  191749.41   0.0000 
dsize_4        4.7e+05     31    .4419737    0.1767  145742.03   0.0000 
lnw            4.7e+05     41    2.827885   -8.1482   71052.99   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inf_pension  | 
     dsize_4 |  -.8414688   .0033879  -248.37   0.000     -.848109   -.8348285 
yh~1_pension |  -.1088604   .0042758   -25.46   0.000    -.1172409   -.1004799 
y~_2_pension |   .0283968   .0013763    20.63   0.000     .0256993    .0310944 
      int2_p |   .0709957   .0050096    14.17   0.000     .0611772    .0808143 
      int3_p |   .0958917   .0054472    17.60   0.000     .0852154     .106568 
      int4_p |   .1095522   .0058646    18.68   0.000     .0980579    .1210465 
      int5_p |   .0874095   .0047428    18.43   0.000     .0781137    .0967052 
    int2_2_p |  -.0203246   .0015489   -13.12   0.000    -.0233604   -.0172889 
    int2_3_p |  -.0255097   .0015631   -16.32   0.000    -.0285733   -.0224461 
    int2_4_p |  -.0297504   .0015469   -19.23   0.000    -.0327823   -.0267186 
    int2_5_p |   -.026313   .0013924   -18.90   0.000    -.0290421   -.0235839 
t_desemple~d |   .1006908   .0116771     8.62   0.000      .077804    .1235776 
  dedad_niv2 |  -.0116357   .0005155   -22.57   0.000    -.0126461   -.0106253 
  dedad_niv3 |  -.0149982   .0006546   -22.91   0.000    -.0162812   -.0137152 
  dedad_niv4 |    -.01192   .0009568   -12.46   0.000    -.0137952   -.0100447 
  dedad_niv5 |   .0000644   .0012867     0.05   0.960    -.0024575    .0025862 
     deduc_2 |  -.0694195    .004038   -17.19   0.000    -.0773338   -.0615052 
     deduc_3 |  -.1159378   .0051863   -22.35   0.000    -.1261029   -.1057728 
     deduc_4 |  -.1389033   .0068182   -20.37   0.000    -.1522668   -.1255398 
     deduc_5 |  -.1175283   .0060555   -19.41   0.000    -.1293969   -.1056597 
     dyear_1 |  -.0033702    .003351    -1.01   0.315    -.0099381    .0031977 
     dyear_2 |   .0169799   .0033113     5.13   0.000     .0104899      .02347 
     dyear_3 |   .0068604   .0029572     2.32   0.020     .0010644    .0126564 
     dyear_4 |   .0282885   .0030735     9.20   0.000     .0222646    .0343125 
     dyear_6 |   .0691606   .0029772    23.23   0.000     .0633253    .0749959 
     dyear_7 |   .0337215   .0031294    10.78   0.000     .0275881     .039855 
     dyear_8 |   .0516459   .0034034    15.17   0.000     .0449753    .0583164 
     dyear_9 |   .0474895   .0032718    14.51   0.000      .041077    .0539021 
    dyear_10 |   .0313253   .0030537    10.26   0.000     .0253402    .0373104 
    dyear_11 |   .0112811   .0029751     3.79   0.000     .0054499    .0171122 
    dyear_12 |    .010177   .0041821     2.43   0.015     .0019802    .0183738 
    dyear_13 |   .0104136   .0041168     2.53   0.011     .0023448    .0184825 
     darea_1 |  -.0855858   .0051056   -16.76   0.000    -.0955925   -.0755791 
     darea_2 |  -.0703609   .0045412   -15.49   0.000    -.0792615   -.0614604 




     darea_4 |  -.0917786   .0051132   -17.95   0.000    -.1018003    -.081757 
     darea_5 |  -.1436599   .0047558   -30.21   0.000     -.152981   -.1343388 
     darea_6 |   -.065632   .0044976   -14.59   0.000    -.0744471   -.0568169 
     darea_7 |  -.0527419   .0046482   -11.35   0.000    -.0618522   -.0436317 
     darea_8 |   -.052083   .0048028   -10.84   0.000    -.0614964   -.0426696 
     darea_9 |  -.0869295    .004789   -18.15   0.000    -.0963156   -.0775433 
    darea_10 |  -.1268356   .0072277   -17.55   0.000    -.1410016   -.1126695 
    darea_11 |  -.0455626   .0046638    -9.77   0.000    -.0547036   -.0364217 
    darea_12 |   -.067658   .0071553    -9.46   0.000     -.081682   -.0536339 
    darea_13 |  -.0796834   .0071097   -11.21   0.000    -.0936181   -.0657487 
    darea_14 |   -.137796   .0069774   -19.75   0.000    -.1514715   -.1241206 
    darea_15 |  -.0304907   .0057245    -5.33   0.000    -.0417105   -.0192709 
       _cons |   .9680996   .0198581    48.75   0.000     .9291784    1.007021 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dsize_4      | 
 inf_pension |  -1.111119   .0061914  -179.46   0.000    -1.123254   -1.098984 
         lnw |  -.0346057   .0021529   -16.07   0.000    -.0388254    -.030386 
pc_lb_size10 |   .0602651   .0043312    13.91   0.000     .0517762     .068754 
t_desemple~d |   .1142948   .0135105     8.46   0.000     .0878147    .1407749 
     dyear_1 |   .0002345   .0038698     0.06   0.952    -.0073502    .0078191 
     dyear_2 |   .0188449   .0038249     4.93   0.000     .0113482    .0263417 
     dyear_3 |   .0057637   .0034204     1.69   0.092    -.0009401    .0124675 
     dyear_4 |   .0274433   .0035544     7.72   0.000     .0204769    .0344098 
     dyear_6 |   .0747447   .0034618    21.59   0.000     .0679597    .0815297 
     dyear_7 |   .0311998   .0036151     8.63   0.000     .0241142    .0382853 
     dyear_8 |   .0347313   .0039659     8.76   0.000     .0269583    .0425043 
     dyear_9 |   .0272686   .0038283     7.12   0.000     .0197653    .0347719 
    dyear_10 |   .0082071   .0035922     2.28   0.022     .0011664    .0152477 
    dyear_11 |  -.0106721   .0034686    -3.08   0.002    -.0174704   -.0038739 
    dyear_12 |  -.0151177   .0048699    -3.10   0.002    -.0246625   -.0055729 
    dyear_13 |  -.0138746   .0047921    -2.90   0.004     -.023267   -.0044823 
     darea_1 |  -.0895434    .005911   -15.15   0.000    -.1011287   -.0779581 
     darea_2 |  -.0691974   .0052541   -13.17   0.000    -.0794953   -.0588995 
     darea_3 |  -.0601481   .0051647   -11.65   0.000    -.0702708   -.0500254 
     darea_4 |  -.0965711   .0059281   -16.29   0.000      -.10819   -.0849522 
     darea_5 |  -.1505221   .0055444   -27.15   0.000    -.1613888   -.1396553 
     darea_6 |  -.0641829   .0052041   -12.33   0.000    -.0743826   -.0539831 
     darea_7 |  -.0546289   .0053726   -10.17   0.000    -.0651591   -.0440987 
     darea_8 |  -.0472199   .0055682    -8.48   0.000    -.0581334   -.0363064 
     darea_9 |  -.0860984   .0055416   -15.54   0.000    -.0969597   -.0752371 
    darea_10 |  -.1288142   .0083632   -15.40   0.000    -.1452058   -.1124226 
    darea_11 |  -.0415452   .0053902    -7.71   0.000    -.0521098   -.0309806 
    darea_12 |  -.0683774   .0082715    -8.27   0.000    -.0845892   -.0521655 
    darea_13 |  -.0774272   .0082199    -9.42   0.000     -.093538   -.0613165 
    darea_14 |  -.1481854    .008076   -18.35   0.000     -.164014   -.1323568 
    darea_15 |  -.0299816   .0066142    -4.53   0.000    -.0429453    -.017018 
       _cons |   1.394287   .0393637    35.42   0.000     1.317135    1.471438 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnw          | 
 inf_pension |   7.014432   .0923456    75.96   0.000     6.833438    7.195426 
     dsize_4 |   5.686664   .0691083    82.29   0.000     5.551214    5.822114 
        educ |   .1028864   .0013236    77.73   0.000     .1002922    .1054805 
        edad |   .1142073   .0015122    75.52   0.000     .1112433    .1171712 




t_desemple~d |  -.6179448   .0466008   -13.26   0.000    -.7092807   -.5266089 
  dedad_niv2 |   .1166993   .0058246    20.04   0.000     .1052832    .1281154 
  dedad_niv3 |   .0244018   .0085514     2.85   0.004     .0076413    .0411622 
  dedad_niv4 |     .03007    .011446     2.63   0.009     .0076363    .0525038 
  dedad_niv5 |  -.0614828   .0158976    -3.87   0.000    -.0926415   -.0303241 
     deduc_2 |  -.0049357   .0054406    -0.91   0.364    -.0155991    .0057277 
     deduc_3 |   .2246909   .0084864    26.48   0.000     .2080579    .2413239 
     deduc_4 |   .3919973   .0116924    33.53   0.000     .3690807    .4149139 
     deduc_5 |     .77398   .0138226    55.99   0.000     .7468882    .8010718 
     dyear_1 |   .1334587   .0132006    10.11   0.000      .107586    .1593315 
     dyear_2 |  -.0789769   .0129771    -6.09   0.000    -.1044116   -.0535422 
     dyear_3 |  -.0671664   .0115718    -5.80   0.000    -.0898466   -.0444862 
     dyear_4 |  -.2958802   .0122682   -24.12   0.000    -.3199254    -.271835 
     dyear_6 |  -.5490185   .0134563   -40.80   0.000    -.5753923   -.5226447 
     dyear_7 |  -.4226898   .0129386   -32.67   0.000     -.448049   -.3973305 
     dyear_8 |  -.9196172   .0145971   -63.00   0.000     -.948227   -.8910074 
     dyear_9 |  -.9720541   .0140968   -68.96   0.000    -.9996833    -.944425 
    dyear_10 |  -.8947259   .0128017   -69.89   0.000    -.9198167   -.8696351 
    dyear_11 |  -.6550874    .011974   -54.71   0.000     -.678556   -.6316187 
    dyear_12 |  -.7302646   .0165856   -44.03   0.000    -.7627718   -.6977573 
    dyear_13 |  -.7083777   .0163394   -43.35   0.000    -.7404024    -.676353 
     darea_1 |   .7916421   .0215522    36.73   0.000     .7494006    .8338836 
     darea_2 |   .7749632   .0191085    40.56   0.000     .7375113    .8124151 
     darea_3 |   .9766956   .0186057    52.49   0.000     .9402292    1.013162 
     darea_4 |   .8221593   .0219914    37.39   0.000     .7790571    .8652616 
     darea_5 |   1.324271   .0236222    56.06   0.000     1.277972    1.370569 
     darea_6 |   .7829295    .018897    41.43   0.000      .745892    .8199669 
     darea_7 |   .4885446     .01878    26.01   0.000     .4517364    .5253528 
     darea_8 |   .7117192   .0194286    36.63   0.000     .6736398    .7497985 
     darea_9 |   .9371219   .0207956    45.06   0.000     .8963633    .9778806 
    darea_10 |   1.273314   .0310292    41.04   0.000     1.212498    1.334131 
    darea_11 |   .5856332   .0188328    31.10   0.000     .5487216    .6225448 
    darea_12 |   .6739513    .028712    23.47   0.000     .6176767    .7302258 
    darea_13 |   .9032649   .0291334    31.00   0.000     .8461644    .9603654 
    darea_14 |   1.126181   .0299208    37.64   0.000     1.067538    1.184825 
    darea_15 |   .3388586   .0226217    14.98   0.000     .2945208    .3831964 
       _cons |   3.734385   .1330128    28.08   0.000     3.473684    3.995085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Endogenous variables:  inf_pension dsize_4 lnw  
Exogenous variables:   yhat_formal_cmc1_pension yhat_formal_cmc1_2_pension  
     int2_p int3_p int4_p int5_p int2_2_p int2_3_p int2_4_p int2_5_p  
     t_desempleo_ciudad dedad_niv2 dedad_niv3 dedad_niv4 dedad_niv5 deduc_2  
     deduc_3 deduc_4 deduc_5 dyear_1 dyear_2 dyear_3 dyear_4 dyear_6 dyear_7  
     dyear_8 dyear_9 dyear_10 dyear_11 dyear_12 dyear_13 darea_1 darea_2  
     darea_3 darea_4 darea_5 darea_6 darea_7 darea_8 darea_9 darea_10  










Appendix A 10. Regression result of Chile 
reg3 (d_inf_ss d_cat_size4 yhat_formal_cmc1 yhat_formal_cmc1_2 int2 int3 int4int5 int2_2 
int2_3 int2_4 int2_5 $Xtodo)  
(d_cat_size4 d_inf_ss lnw pc_lb_size10 $Xd) 
(lnw d_cat_size4 educ edad edad_sq $Xtodo) if lnw>0 & exp>=0 & o1==1; 
 
Three-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
d_inf_ss       5.4e+05     41    .4413699    0.1926  145919.17   0.0000 
d_cat_size4    5.4e+05     25    .5130686   -0.0581   83382.45   0.0000 




             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
d_inf_ss     | 
 d_cat_size4 |  -.7010495   .0045274  -154.85   0.000    -.7099231    -.692176 
yhat_forma~1 |  -.0698755   .0043097   -16.21   0.000    -.0783224   -.0614285 
yhat_form~_2 |   .0073176   .0011243     6.51   0.000      .005114    .0095212 
        int2 |  -.0067742   .0070479    -0.96   0.336    -.0205878    .0070395 
        int3 |   .0008381   .0061652     0.14   0.892    -.0112456    .0129217 
        int4 |   .0423749   .0048512     8.73   0.000     .0328666    .0518831 
        int5 |   .0337983   .0053763     6.29   0.000      .023261    .0443357 
      int2_2 |   .0031055   .0016509     1.88   0.060    -.0001302    .0063412 
      int2_3 |   .0021138   .0013825     1.53   0.126    -.0005959    .0048235 
      int2_4 |  -.0057007   .0011486    -4.96   0.000    -.0079519   -.0034495 
      int2_5 |  -.0052249   .0011458    -4.56   0.000    -.0074706   -.0029792 
 d_edad_niv2 |  -.0113779   .0008387   -13.57   0.000    -.0130217   -.0097342 
 d_edad_niv3 |  -.0034839   .0010896    -3.20   0.001    -.0056195   -.0013482 
 d_edad_niv4 |   .0118123   .0015438     7.65   0.000     .0087865     .014838 
 d_edad_niv5 |   .0415391   .0023711    17.52   0.000     .0368918    .0461864 
d_educ_niv~2 |   -.013953   .0074924    -1.86   0.063    -.0286379    .0007319 
d_educ_niv~3 |  -.0554002   .0072683    -7.62   0.000    -.0696458   -.0411546 
d_educ_niv~4 |  -.1341576   .0064056   -20.94   0.000    -.1467122   -.1216029 
d_educ_niv~5 |  -.1347294   .0111625   -12.07   0.000    -.1566075   -.1128513 
     d_year2 |   .0586156   .0032437    18.07   0.000      .052258    .0649732 
     d_year3 |   .0636792   .0031328    20.33   0.000      .057539    .0698194 
     d_year4 |   .0324117    .003276     9.89   0.000     .0259908    .0388325 
     d_year5 |   .0811478   .0030676    26.45   0.000     .0751353    .0871602 
     d_year6 |   .1022151   .0029748    34.36   0.000     .0963846    .1080456 
     d_year7 |   .0933069   .0029453    31.68   0.000     .0875341    .0990797 
     d_year8 |    .071394   .0029358    24.32   0.000     .0656399     .077148 
     d_year9 |   .0848553   .0030285    28.02   0.000     .0789196     .090791 
   d_region1 |   .0054684   .0160833     0.34   0.734    -.0260543     .036991 
   d_region2 |  -.0011127   .0160694    -0.07   0.945    -.0326083    .0303828 
   d_region3 |  -.0067338   .0161015    -0.42   0.676    -.0382922    .0248247 
   d_region4 |   .0156846   .0159524     0.98   0.326    -.0155816    .0469508 
   d_region5 |  -.0280397   .0158168    -1.77   0.076    -.0590401    .0029607 
   d_region6 |  -.0293877   .0158816    -1.85   0.064    -.0605152    .0017397 
   d_region7 |   .0214075   .0158471     1.35   0.177    -.0096521    .0524672 




   d_region9 |   .0211047   .0158737     1.33   0.184    -.0100071    .0522165 
  d_region10 |  -.0275991   .0158551    -1.74   0.082    -.0586745    .0034763 
  d_region11 |  -.0431196   .0163626    -2.64   0.008    -.0751896   -.0110495 
  d_region12 |  -.1426578   .0164235    -8.69   0.000    -.1748473   -.1104683 
  d_region13 |   .0084833   .0157726     0.54   0.591    -.0224305    .0393971 
  d_region14 |  -.0284079   .0182407    -1.56   0.119    -.0641591    .0073433 
       _cons |   .8001441    .016469    48.58   0.000     .7678656    .8324227 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
d_cat_size4  | 
    d_inf_ss |  -1.053068   .0064765  -162.60   0.000    -1.065761   -1.040374 
         lnw |  -.0749209   .0019693   -38.05   0.000    -.0787806   -.0710612 
pc_lb_size10 |   .2470981   .0056413    43.80   0.000     .2360413    .2581549 
     d_year2 |    .127761   .0038599    33.10   0.000     .1201957    .1353263 
     d_year3 |   .0708465   .0036021    19.67   0.000     .0637866    .0779064 
     d_year4 |   .0436191   .0037716    11.57   0.000     .0362269    .0510114 
     d_year5 |   .1017716    .003606    28.22   0.000     .0947039    .1088392 
     d_year6 |   .1145638   .0035019    32.72   0.000     .1077003    .1214273 
     d_year7 |    .108455   .0034664    31.29   0.000     .1016611     .115249 
     d_year8 |   .0922592   .0034546    26.71   0.000     .0854883    .0990301 
     d_year9 |   .1155916   .0036714    31.48   0.000     .1083957    .1227874 
   d_region1 |  -.0043396   .0183092    -0.24   0.813     -.040225    .0315458 
   d_region2 |  -.0092181   .0182916    -0.50   0.614    -.0450689    .0266327 
   d_region3 |  -.0099126   .0183313    -0.54   0.589    -.0458413    .0260161 
   d_region4 |   .0141028   .0181628     0.78   0.437    -.0214956    .0497012 
   d_region5 |  -.0379088   .0180132    -2.10   0.035    -.0732139   -.0026036 
   d_region6 |  -.0313429   .0180886    -1.73   0.083     -.066796    .0041101 
   d_region7 |   .0203806   .0180438     1.13   0.259    -.0149847    .0557458 
   d_region8 |   .0042346    .017989     0.24   0.814    -.0310232    .0394925 
   d_region9 |   .0133231   .0180742     0.74   0.461    -.0221017     .048748 
  d_region10 |  -.0315903    .018052    -1.75   0.080    -.0669716    .0037909 
  d_region11 |  -.0434329   .0186278    -2.33   0.020    -.0799427   -.0069231 
  d_region12 |  -.1524021   .0187112    -8.14   0.000    -.1890754   -.1157288 
  d_region13 |   -.001051   .0179608    -0.06   0.953    -.0362535    .0341516 
  d_region14 |  -.0359876    .020771    -1.73   0.083    -.0766981    .0047228 
       _cons |   1.614263   .0318693    50.65   0.000     1.551801    1.676726 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnw          | 
 d_cat_size4 |   .2812152   .0088246    31.87   0.000     .2639193    .2985111 
        educ |    .056608   .0006437    87.95   0.000     .0553465    .0578695 
        edad |   .0386363   .0010981    35.19   0.000     .0364841    .0407885 
     edad_sq |  -.0002207   .0000124   -17.79   0.000    -.0002451   -.0001964 
 d_edad_niv2 |   .0539562   .0054408     9.92   0.000     .0432924    .0646199 
 d_edad_niv3 |   .0262331   .0084579     3.10   0.002     .0096558    .0428103 
 d_edad_niv4 |  -.0018439   .0103421    -0.18   0.858     -.022114    .0184262 
 d_edad_niv5 |   .0829594   .0130567     6.35   0.000     .0573688    .1085499 
d_educ_niv~2 |   .0030271   .0041462     0.73   0.465    -.0050994    .0111536 
d_educ_niv~3 |   .0799584   .0049136    16.27   0.000      .070328    .0895888 
d_educ_niv~4 |   .3042265    .007374    41.26   0.000     .2897737    .3186793 
d_educ_niv~5 |   .6926742   .0092126    75.19   0.000     .6746178    .7107306 
     d_year2 |   .1121978   .0056957    19.70   0.000     .1010345    .1233611 
     d_year3 |   .0874619   .0054976    15.91   0.000     .0766869    .0982369 
     d_year4 |   .1725708   .0057528    30.00   0.000     .1612956     .183846 
     d_year5 |   .2136492   .0053878    39.65   0.000     .2030893    .2242091 




     d_year7 |   .1623939     .00517    31.41   0.000     .1522608    .1725269 
     d_year8 |   .2346744   .0051664    45.42   0.000     .2245485    .2448004 
     d_year9 |   .3510652   .0053407    65.73   0.000     .3405976    .3615328 
   d_region1 |  -.0369357   .0282413    -1.31   0.191    -.0922877    .0184163 
   d_region2 |   .1109334   .0282114     3.93   0.000     .0556401    .1662268 
   d_region3 |  -.0105327   .0282793    -0.37   0.710     -.065959    .0448936 
   d_region4 |  -.1807479   .0280107    -6.45   0.000    -.2356479   -.1258479 
   d_region5 |  -.1177116   .0277746    -4.24   0.000    -.1721488   -.0632743 
   d_region6 |  -.1590576    .027892    -5.70   0.000    -.2137249   -.1043903 
   d_region7 |  -.2086473   .0278254    -7.50   0.000    -.2631842   -.1541105 
   d_region8 |  -.2436431   .0277349    -8.78   0.000    -.2980025   -.1892837 
   d_region9 |  -.2463909   .0278712    -8.84   0.000    -.3010174   -.1917644 
  d_region10 |  -.0342094   .0278432    -1.23   0.219    -.0887809    .0203622 
  d_region11 |    .159897   .0287312     5.57   0.000     .1035849    .2162091 
  d_region12 |   .1737191   .0288305     6.03   0.000     .1172124    .2302258 
  d_region13 |   .0169406   .0276985     0.61   0.541    -.0373475    .0712286 
  d_region14 |  -.1098235   .0320308    -3.43   0.001    -.1726028   -.0470443 
       _cons |   10.22011   .0334264   305.75   0.000     10.15459    10.28562 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Endogenous variables:  d_inf_ss d_cat_size4 lnw  
Exogenous variables:   yhat_formal_cmc1 yhat_formal_cmc1_2 int2 int3 int4  
     int5 int2_2 int2_3 int2_4 int2_5 d_edad_niv2 d_edad_niv3 d_edad_niv4  
     d_edad_niv5 d_educ_nivel2 d_educ_nivel3 d_educ_nivel4 d_educ_nivel5  
     d_year2 d_year3 d_year4 d_year5 d_year6 d_year7 d_year8 d_year9  
     d_region1 d_region2 d_region3 d_region4 d_region5 d_region6 d_region7  
     d_region8 d_region9 d_region10 d_region11 d_region12 d_region13  
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